The separation between control and ownership in the modern firm creates information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. The superior knowledge about the firm's operations stimulates managers to manage financial information. We investigate which managers characteristics are more likely to positively influence earnings management practices. Specifically, we study whether the CEO's age, education, expected tenure and duality of roles affects earnings management for a sample of listed Portuguese firms for the fiscal years 2005 to 2009. Results indicate that older CEOs, CEOs with management or finance background, and CEOs that also hold the position of Chairman of the board of directors are more prone to manage earnings.
Introduction
Accounting literature has widely studied the concept and the implications of earnings management. Earnings management behavior takes place when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the firm or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) . Because capital markets are imperfect and incomplete, accounting information is necessary to solve information asymmetry problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dechow and Skinner, 2000) . Managers are required to provide financial reports to external users of information particularly to capital providers. Discretionary reporting and earnings manipulation occur because managers have more knowledge about the firm than external users and have incentives to manipulate. Managers manipulate earnings to increase compensation, ensure job security, and meet analysts' earnings forecasts (Schipper, 1989; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006) . In addition, managers manage accounting numbers to avoid violation of debt covenants and maintain favorable conditions in debt contracting (Chava et al., 2010; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994) .
As the CEO is the critical agent determining financial reporting quality, his particular conditions on the job are likely to influence the level of earnings management. We investigate the association between characteristics of the firm's CEO and earnings management, namely the CEO's age, education, expected tenure in the firm, and duality of chair roles. Prior studies have established a link between these characteristics and financial reporting policies. For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992a) show that the agency problem increases as the CEO approaches retirement. In his last year in the job the CEO takes advantage of his private information to improve firm performance in order to achieve higher compensation in the final year or after leaving the job. And Bhagat et al., (2010) find that CEOs with MBA degrees tend to manage accounting numbers in order to improve short-term firm performance. We study the association between CEO characteristics and earnings management in Portuguese listed firms for the period 2005 to 2009. Portugal is a small economy where many firms are family-owned, CEOs often have close relationships with board members and shareholders, and controls oversighting the CEO actions are usually weak (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Djankov et al., 2008) . Moreover, Portuguese regulation of corporate governance is mostly about disclosure and it is often not enforced. In fact, both the stock market regulator and the OECD recognize that the application of the rules has been weak (CMVM, 2006 and OECD, 2011) . It is interesting to observe such context because on one hand CEOs have more freedom to manage earnings when governance controls are inefficient and enforcement is weak, but on the other hand CEOs has fewer incentives to manage accounting numbers because there is less information asymmetry between shareholders and managers.
The empirical results show that CEO's characteristics affect earnings management behavior in listed Portuguese firms. Namely, we find that older CEOs, CEOs with management or finance education, and CEOs that also hold the position of Chairman of the board of directors are more prone to manage earnings. The results indicate that the choice of the individual to manage the business and his contract conditions have important economic consequences for shareholders and users of financial information. These findings can help shareholders in the selection of the appropriate CEO and can also assist financial statement users to infer about the quality of accounting numbers reported by the manager.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design. Section 4 describes the sample and descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Prior literature and hypotheses
Agency theory suggests that CEO reporting practices vary throughout his career. When a CEO is older and is nearing retirement age the horizon problem may occur. The horizon problem is related to a myopic behavior of the CEO who focuses on short-term performance instead of investing on future profitability and firm value creation (Dechow and Sloan, 1991) . As the CEO comes close to retirement, reputation and career concerns typically diminish. In addition, in the last years with the firm the CEO is less prone to take on positive net value projects that have long payback periods that will only reward their successors. This behavior increases the agency problem as the CEO take advantage of his private information to improve short-term firm performance in order to achieve better compensation in the last years, greater retirement pay, and greater option value (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992a) . For these reasons we expect to observe more earnings management as the CEO´s age increase. This phenomenon has been observed in relation to R&D expenses (Barker and Mueller, 2002) , capital expenditures (Conyon, 2006) and firm profitability (Davidson III et al., 2007) . Taking these points into consideration we test the following hypothesis:
H1: The CEO"s age is positively related to earnings management CEO education is one of the characteristics considered by the board when selecting a executive to manage the firm. The board typically chooses a manager with appropriate knowledge, expertise and competence to maximize shareholder value. CEOs with higher education in management and finance sciences are usually seen as the best equipped to run a business and make it grow. However, their expertise can also be used for their own benefit. Given the right incentives CEOs with a management and finance background are more skilled to use discretion in the choice of accounting policies and to manipulate earnings. Bhagat et al., (2010) show that hiring CEOs with MBA degrees leads to improvements in short-term firm performance but not in long-term performance. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that CEOs with MBAs are in general more aggressive managers. Thus, we study the following hypothesis:
H2: Management and financial education of the CEO increases the practice of earnings management When the CEO plans to leave the firm in a short horizon he may be motivated by self interests rather than maximizing shareholders' wealth. Similarly to older CEOs, the executive with shortterm horizon takes on projects with lower or negative net present values, with higher current earnings and fast payback periods instead of projects with higher net present value but with longer payback periods (Antia et al., 2010) . In order to get greater compensation and signal superior abilities to the labor markets, the CEO may choose to manage earnings in his last years in the firm hoping to exit the firm before his poor performance becomes visible (Campbell and Marino, 1994) . For example, Dechow and Sloan (1991) shows that CEOs decrease R&D and advertising expenditures in their final years in office to increase short-term earnings and bonuses. But contrary to this evidence Cheng (2004) does not find a relation between CEO turnover and R&D expenditures, and Gibbons and Murphy (1992a) and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) show that investment decisions are not explained by CEO turnover. Another motivation of CEOs to manage earnings in the final years in office is to ensure board seats. The number of board seats after retirement depends largely on the reported performance of the CEO in his final years in the firm. Therefore, CEOs about to retire have incentives to use their discretion to manage earnings as a way to ensure future board roles (Brickley et al., 1999) . But this desire to get more board seats can also work as an incentive to nonmanipulation behavior because the CEO may want to keep a board seat in his firm after retirement and be worried about maintaining his reputation. We investigate whether the proximity of the CEO's final year in the job increases or decreases earnings management behavior. We state the following hypothesis:
H3: When the CEO is in his final years in office there is higher earnings management
Another agency problem that may lead to earnings management is the concentration of CEO functions, particularly the functions of Chairman of the board and CEO. National and international regulations recommend separation between the Chairman and the CEO as a way to allocate monitoring and management responsibilities to different individuals (OECD, 2004; CMVM, 2010) . The separation between management and monitoring improves independence and the quality of internal controls.
In addition, non-dual leadership promotes the protection of minority shareholders that face higher information asymmetries as they are less informed and less in contact with top executives than the controlling shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993) . Prior empirical literature found evidence that earnings management increases when the CEO is simultaneously the chairman of the board (Dechow et al., 1996; Davidson et al., 2004) . And Chen et al., (2006) show that firms that commit fraud usually have a CEO who also serves as the Chairman. However, Brickley et al. (1997) suggests that dual structures have costs associated with nonoptimal decisions such as information costs, costs with two large salaries, reputational costs and other costs related to shared authority, suggesting that role separation costs may be higher than the agency costs of dual leadership. Thus, it is unclear whether duality affects earnings management behavior. We investigate whether there is a link between the firm's leadership structure and the susceptibility to earnings management activities and state the following hypothesis:
H4: When a CEO assumes both the role of chief executive and chairman of the board of directors there is higher earnings management

Research design
Earnings management
Earnings management is difficult to observe and thus complex to measure. A widely used method to detect earnings management is the discretionary accruals models. Although extensively used these models have also been criticized for measuring earnings management with substantial error (Guay et al., 1996; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2010) .
Income Smoothing is another method of detecting earnings management. The idea behind the method is that the CEO smooths earnings by maintaining it at the same level for several years and thus giving the idea of a constant earnings growth. The CEO may delay income recognition (understate) when the firm is over performing and shift income forward when the firm is underperforming (Gaver et al., 1995) . This way, the manager leads shareholders to believe that the value of their shares will constantly increase in the future. By smoothing earnings, the CEO feels that his tenure is secure and his bonus compensation will keep in line with the earnings level that he establishes (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Gaver et al., 1995) . Examples of recent studies that measured earnings management through income smoothing are Burgstahler et al. (2006) , Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and Leuz et al. (2003) . We use income smoothing as a proxy for earnings management and estimate the following model:
. Next we define variables. All variables are for firm i and time t but for ease of notation subscripts are removed throughout the text.
Earnings management is defined as a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the firm´s smoothness ratio is above the sample median and zero otherwise. Smoothness is calculated as the ratio of the five-year standard deviation of operating income divided by the five-year standard deviation of cash flows from operations, multiplied by minus one so that higher values of the measure indicate higher values of earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003) . Using a discrete variable to measure earnings management has the advantage of reducing the influence of extreme observations which is particularly important in small samples.
CEO characteristics
We study the following CEO characteristics. The age of the CEO (AGE) defined as the CEO's age in years. In case of CEO turnover before the end of his mandate the average of both executives age is used. The CEO´s education (EDUCATION) defined as an indicator variable coded one when the manager's education is in the management or finance fields and zero otherwise (other fields of education). The CEO's TENURE defined as an indicator variable coded one if the CEO has one year or less to end his mandate and zero otherwise (more than one year left on the job). Duality of the CEO (DUALILTY) defined as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the same individual held the positions of CEO and Chairman of the board in the firm and zero otherwise (CEO and Chairman are different individuals). Following the hypotheses developed in the previous section we expect a positive relation between earnings management and these CEO characteristics.
Control variables
We have also considered firm specific conditions identified in previous studies as being associated with earnings management behavior. The firm characteristics are as follows. SIZE is measured as the log market capitalization at the fiscal year end. Large firms have more possibilities to manage earnings but they are also under more scrutiny from the public and regulatory entities which reduces incentives to manipulate earnings (Leuz et al., 2003; Moses, 1987) . LEVERAGE measured as the ratio of debt to equity is expected to be positively related to earnings management. Firms with higher leverage are more likely to violate debt covenants and thus have incentives to manage earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . GROWTH measured as the standard deviation of the firm's rolling five-year sales revenues, scaled by total assets. Growth in sales is usually associated with more earnings volatility and more negative values of our earnings management measure (Burgstahler et al., 2006) . PERFORMANCE, measured as ROA (return on assets equal to net income scaled by total assets), is a proxy for firm performance and is negatively associated with earnings management. Firms with better performance are more likely to meet analysts' forecasts and debt contracts thus do not need to resort to manipulation (Kalyta, 2009; Bauman and Shaw, 2006) .
Data and descriptive statistics
Financial data for the sample firms was obtained via Thomson/Datastream and checked against firms' financial reports. CEO information was hand-collected from financial reports and press releases. The sample comprises all firms included in the PSI-20 stock market index. After dropping firm-years for which financial information was not available the final sample consists of 90 firm-year observations for 19 firms and for fiscal years 2005 to 2009. We selected these firms because they are the largest and economically more significant firms in the Portuguese economy. Also, they are subject to more stringent public and regulatory scrutiny and to additional auditing which is expected to result in higher reporting quality. These circumstances are likely to work against us finding the expected results. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. The average sample firm has 3,782 million Euros of market capitalization, 16,114 million Euros of assets and operating income of 330 million Euros. The level of debt exceeds equity more than three times and financial performance, based on ROA, is relatively low (3%). About 47% of the sample firms show signs of earnings management as the level of smoothness is above the sample median. The average executive age is 53 years. The CEO has a management or finance background in 84% of the cases, is about to leave his job in 31% of the cases, and accumulates the role of CEO and Chairman of the board in 37% of the cases. Table 2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the regression tests.
The correlation between earnings management and the CEO characteristics is positive in all cases except for TENURE when it is close to zero. Overall, the Pearson correlations between variables are low indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem and is unlikely to affect the regression results. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were also computed to check for multicollinearity problems. The VIF results (not tabulated) confirm that multicollinearity is not a serious problem as the factors are all smaller than the usual threshold of ten.
Empirical results
The empirical results of the association between earnings management behavior and four CEO characteristics are presented in Tables 3 to 6 . For each CEO characteristic we estimate three logit models with a different set of control variables. Table 3 presents the results of the association between earnings management and the CEO age. We find that age is positively and significantly associated with earnings management practices, for the three models. This result supports H1 and indicates that older CEOs are more inclined to manipulate earnings to achieve higher short-term performance. In line with previous literature (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992a) we interpret this behavior as an attempt to improve compensation as retirement age approaches. The results for the firmspecific variables suggest that earnings management increases with leverage and decreases with growth and financial performance. But the results for the control variables are not statistically significant at the conventional levels.
The results of the association between earnings management and CEO education support H2 (Table  4) . Managers with management or finance studies are more prone to smooth earnings in all model specifications. This result is in line with the argument that a CEO with finance knowledge has more ability to manipulate accounting information. A CEO with management or finance education is more likely to manage earnings in order to report better firm performance in the short-term (Bhagat et al., 2010) . Table 5 reports the estimated results on the relation between the CEO's tenure and earnings manipulation. Contrary to the stated H3 we find no significant association between the two variables. The fact that the manager is about to leave the job does not seem to increase earnings management. A possible reason for this result is that in a small business environment such as the Portuguese economy the CEO is often re-appointed as CEO or appointed to other relevant job in the firm. And even when he leaves the firm it is common that he keeps personal and professional links. Another explanation is the existence of governance mechanisms that mitigate managers' opportunistic behavior before turnover like stock-based incentives linked to future firm performance. But we have no information to explore these explanations.
Finally, in Table 7 we provide empirical estimations on the association between CEO duality and earnings management. Consistent with H4 we find that earnings management increase when the CEO also holds the position of Chairman of the board of directors. When the same individual assumes the functions of CEO and Chairman that individual has more power to influence board members reducing efficient board monitoring (Jensen, 1993) .
Overall, the empirical results indicate that some CEO characteristics are relevant determinants of earnings management.
Conclusion
This study analyzes the relation between characteristics of the firm's CEO and earnings management. We find that earnings management behavior increases when the CEO is older, has a management or finance background and accumulates the role of CEO and Chairman of the board of directors. We study the association between CEO characteristics and earnings management in Portuguese listed firms for the period 2005 to 2009. Portugal is a small economy where many firms are family-owned, CEOs have close relationships with board members and shareholders, and controls over the CEO actions can be weak (Djankov et al. 2008) . Moreover, Portuguese regulation of corporate governance is often not enforced (CMVM, 2006; OECD 2011) . It is interesting to observe such context because on one hand CEOs have more freedom to manage earnings, but on the other hand CEOs face less incentives to manage accounting numbers because there is less information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. The empirical results show that CEO's characteristics affect earnings management behavior. Namely, we find that older CEOs, CEOs with management or finance education, and CEOs that also hold the position of Chairman of the board of directors are more prone to manage earnings. The results indicate that the choice of the individual to manage the business and his contract conditions have important economic consequences for shareholders and users of financial information. These findings can help shareholders in the selection of the appropriate CEO and can also assist financial statement users to infer about the quality of accounting numbers reported by the manager.
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